Payment Processing Victims are netted (hooked) by fake direct response emails to a job seeker’s online resume or by fake job offers sent by bulk email.
The patter (what the scammers say): Top of Page
A member of the scam group (scamployer) poses as foreign company, charitable organization, investment firm,
artist or other self-employed person seeking employees to process payments / donations / investments made
by their customers in the US [Canada, the UK, Australia, wherever the job seeker resides]. The reason given
is that the banks in the scamployer’s country take too long to process overseas payments, leading to customer
complaints.
Other job offers are for the position of regional payment processor, meaning that payments are to be accepted
from the customers regardless of the method of delivery, including funds wired to the scamployee either
directly into the scamployee’s account or by Western Union / MoneyGram. NOTE: Some scam group use the name
of actual companies, such as Shell, Coca Cola UK, AGIP (an Italian oil company), or other corporation that can
be looked up on the Internet. Many people will verify the company’s existence online and stop there without
contacting the company directly to verify the employment offer. Some fear upsetting the boat, others believe
that owning a web site is a form of validation in itself.
Yet another job offer is that of Mystery Shopper wherein the scamployee is instructed to test various Western
Union and MoneyGram offices for their efficiency and courtesy.
Another excuse given by the scamployer is the need for a local collections agent to collect bad debts.
In this instance, the scamployee is given domestic phone numbers to call (different throwaway cell phone
numbers). The calls are answered by one or more in country members of the scam group who state they are
sorry to be late with the payment which will be sent immediately. A few days later, the scamployee receives
a check or money order as promised.
Duties: Top of Page
To receive payments from customers domestic to the victim’s country of residence, forwarding all but a
commission of 10% to 20% to the scamployer via Western Union, MoneyGram, or bank to bank (see Funds
transferred using Western Union, MoneyGram, or bank-to-bank and Funds transferred using PayPal in this flow
chart). NOTE: Scamployees are frequently instructed to wire funds to different addresses that they
have been told are various company offices. What they are actually doing is wiring money to different
members of the scam group. This is each member’s share as determined by the group leader based on the
member’s participation in the scam.
In the case of a Mystery Shopper ploy, the scamployee is sent counterfeit drafts to cash and wire through
designated “test” Western Union and/or MoneyGram offices. Because many such offices question funds going
to certain geographical areas such as Nigeria and Romania or the Ukraine, the scamployee is instructed to
state that the money is being sent to relatives.
NOTE: Scam group members do not cash or deposit counterfeit drafts themselves as this places the
entire group at a high risk of exposure and defeats the successful methodology of the scam. See Scam Group:
Posing as a foreign employer (scamployer). Methodology of the scam in this flow chart.
Victims: Top of Page
General targets: The unemployed single parents people needing a second job people on fixed income
people who are disabled students are often specifically targeted, shut-ins, work-at-home bill collectors
and anyone seeking additional income.
General victim profile: People who are lured into this scam have no understanding of proper
accounting procedures or banking processes and are quick to follow orders. They frequently co-mingle funds,
depositing counterfeit drafts and/or receiving wired funds into their personal checking or savings account.
In the event of wired funds, because the scamployee is now taking orders from his “boss” he gives no thought
to (nor does he question) the fact that it is unnecessary to wire funds twice and that there is no waiting
period for wired funds.
Those who deposit drafts and subsequently wire the funds do so in the belief that the draft has been validated
when their bank makes the funds available. In those instances when a separate account is opened for
processing drafts and proper accounting procedures are maintained, the victim still has no understanding of
the banking system.
Payment Processing Victims are at increased risk of Identity Theft. See Stolen Identity and Financial Data
in this flow chart.
NOTE: The term “cleared” has no legal meaning and is not listed in the Uniform Commercial Code (Parts
3, 4, 4A). Funds credited to a depositor’s bank are a provisional loan from the depositor’s bank to the
depositor while the depositor bank awaits payment from the draft account bank. This credited money is listed
as available funds. The only way to avoid a provisional loan is to have a draft sent for collection,
meaning no funds are credited until the depositor’s bank has been paid. A hold merely confirms that the
draft account has not been flagged and contains sufficient funds. A hold does not fully validate a draft.
An account holder has one full year to declare that a draft is no good.
